A Few Good Men, Well.. Just Two Actually

I finally got round to watching Nick Robinson's documentary on the formation of the coalition agreement over five days last may. It's worth reflecting on what a remarkable achievement that really was.As ever it's the biggest events, the ones that define everything that comes after them - if only because they form part of the filter we use to see the world, that we forget were not always going to happen. This is probably because we don't just see the future differently but also the past. It's a worrying thought, the idea that we can't look back with certainty, and it's one of the reasons I decided to start writing a blog (although I'm keenly aware that this only goes some way to alleviating the problem). But anyway, in this case, it seems that we can make a case for the events of those days in may being, if not obvious and inevitable, more likely than many at the time thought (including myself).

The reason for this seems chiefly to be personal rather than political (to use that word 'political' in a sense that means, if we are being honest 'ideological'). Of course this might be a reflection of Nick Robinson's remarkable ability to perceive the human terrain of a political battle, if he has a fault it would be overplaying it's significance from time to time, but on this occasion it really does seem the best, if not only, explanation. It Hopefully also explains the pictures (right and below to the left) because I speak, of course, when I say personal of the extraordinary relationship between David Cameron and Nick Clegg. It would be too much of a stretch to say that they make the coalition work, as it would of any government (single or multi party), but they do seem to have made it happen. The reason is as simple as, and I think Nick Robinson has said as much, trust. Trust is that basis of all other relationships, which are at least partially defined by the level of trust required. As such it is also incredibly hard to build from scratch, the higher the stakes the more this is true.

So how did they do it? How did the eerie premonition on my right (the London 2012 mascots) turn to reality so quickly, allowing adversaries to become friends? The short answer is that they didn't and it didn't, and that is because thinking about it that way it really would have been impossible, if you follow me. This situation wasn't created overnight, election night or otherwise. The truth, if you will take my word for it, is that trust comes from common experience - that's why even adversarial politics works best when those involved have similar spheres of experience. When Thomas Hobbes theorised that free men under no law but nature would inevitably conflict it was becuase there could be no trust, and this was because his epistemological view committed him to the idea that there could be no genuine common experience. I would guess that most people do think that common experience is possible, if not I can offer a little in the way of proof, but I doubt this will be needed. Cameron and Clegg have common experience by the bucket-load, They are both affluent, privately educated young men (born less than a year apart), one studied at Oxford and the other at Cambridge. They entered parliament only 4 years apart and for both the 2010 election was their first as leader. Politically importantly they both won the leadership of their respective parties by being bold, with a mandate for change. Need I go on? Without wanting to overplay the obligatory marriage metaphors the phrase 'made for each other' occurs. Of course this has all been said, better, but it never hurts to labour a good and important point, lest we forget that it might have been otherwise!

Cameron Direct... But Does Anoyone Think He's wrong?

A few days ago David Cameron, self styled strait talking British Prime minister (since his civil partnership with a Mr N. Clegg brought him to power) made some rather rude remarks about Pakistan. As picking the right audience goes this was a master-stroke, he was speaking in India, but the morning after the night before brought the reaction from less receptive audiences. Being undiplomatic can be a virtue in the right circumstances, but not usually when the activity is in fact diplomacy. Certainly when David Milliband appears to have bested you as an example of an experienced elder statesman you must have done or said something terribly wrong. Yes?

Well Maybe... Two thoughts strike, firstly when someone says you are being undiplomatic that is usually a way of disapproving without having to say that the claims, allegations, mud thrown ect is, in base of fact, incorrect. I should probably declare that I'm not an expert on Pakistan, or anything for that matter, so i'll have to make a general comment suffice (as opposed to some detailed factual accusation against the ISI pulled from Wikileaks). By way of that I would point out that this is by no means the first time that Pakistan has been accused of 'looking both ways' (to borrow a phrase) and that if this is a convenient fiction of the generic 'west' or the media then they have also done a bloody good job of finding Pakistanis who seem to agree.With this in mind the fact that most critical voices on Cameron's comments have sought to show more how they were 'unhelpful' or didn't 'reflect the full picture', and not that it is simply in error regarding it's central assertion, must tell us something about the central paradigmatic assumption in this debate. Namely that, while 'our' view of the problem focuses on (and I always find it impossible to find the right word in these sentences but I will grit my teeth and go for...) violent Islamists wherever they reside, Pakistan's strategic vision is uncomfortably concious of borders. For us the word key word Taleban, but in Islamabad it really matters whether it is preceded by the word Afghan or Pakistani, and this will always make us justifiably nervous. Can we really blame Cameron for daring to mention this tension so explicitly?

Secondly even in the likely event that what I have written above is total bollocks I feel bound to come back to my point about the India. We of course want to secure, if possible, excellent relations with both India and Pakistan. But what if we had to choose? In strait Machiavellian terms - whom does Britain value more? Mired in an Afghan war that we seem unable to extract ourselves from, at least in what most people would recognise as the short term, it would be easy to say Pakistan. I won't list now the various problems that a hostile Pakistan would cause but, euphemistically simply, it wouldn't help. Again however, two thoughts... Firstly there is a huge gulf between a nauseatingly friendly, heavily supportive relationship that we lose our minds looking for and 'hostile' in the traditional sense. It's easy, and probably fair, to spout out that line that goes 'anything that makes the job of our brave troops harder is unacceptable...' but it still seems totally illegitimate to then trot out everything Pakistan does for us as being at risk because of the slightest slur. Secondly if we can extricate ourselves by the not so dead 2015 deadline, which there is surely reason to think we can (even if we can find plenty more to say we can't), what will Pakistan mean to us then? We have seen that radical insurgent Islamism can survive war, or a crusade at the very least, but in the past it has been much worse at peace. We could indeed find in around a decade that we have a uselessly strong bilateral relationship with Pakistan at the expense of an extremely useful one with the world class power of India next door. If we accept this argument then even if Cameron was wrong he could in fact have been right to say it, if we take the long view.

My personal view on this is utterly clouded by the usual warm fuzzy feeling inside whenever someone says something wonderfully unexpected, off script, that reflects their real view and not what we have heard them quote off a script far too often before. I find the more I accept that the latter is what politics does and must consist of the more I really enjoy it when this breaks down. In spite of this I think I can comfortably reject the idea that this is anything remotely close to open and shut.